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The Highway Beautification Act:
Cosmetic for the City?
Ruth R. Johnson
The Highway Beautification Act of 19651 is part of a body of law dealing
with federal assistance for highway construction. 2 Classically, the federal-
aid highway program is considered a partnership arrangement with the states
designating and building the highways and the federal government providing
a portion of the funds and overviewing to protect the national interest. The
Highway Beautification Act calls upon the states to control outdoor ad-
vertising and junkyards and provides federal funds for landscaping and
scenic enhancement. An analysis of its effect on the urban environment re-
quires an understanding of what the program attempts to accomplish and
the reasons for its existence.
Bonus Program
Like many other pieces of legislation, the Highway Beautification Act is
neither the beginning nor the end of federal and state effort in these fields,
it represents simply a step in the progression of such effort.
Federal interest in controlling outdoor advertising came to the fore in 1956.
Construction of the interstate highway system commenced in that year s
and with it public opinion rose sharply concerning the need to control out-
door advertising signs along the planned 42,500 mile network. Thus, in
1958 Congress took action by providing a voluntary program under which
states could enter into agreements with the federal government to control
outdoor advertising along the interstate system and thereby become eligible
for a bonus payment in the amount of one-half of one percent of the con-
1. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (Supp. V, 1970).
2. Id. §§ 101-41, 301-20 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970), and §§ 501-11
(Supp. V, 1970).
3. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 374 (codified in scattered sections
of 23 U.S.C.).
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struction cost of the highway project. 4 The program called for the control
of outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the edge of the inter-
state right-of-way. Within the controlled areas, four classes of signs were
permitted, subject to national standards:
(1) directional and other official signs, e.g., "no hunting," "no
fishing," "Welcome to Mayberry";
(2) on premise signs which advertise the sale or lease of, or ac-
tivities conducted upon the property where the signs are lo-
cated;
(3) signs within 12 air miles of the advertised activity; and
(4) signs in the specific interest of the traveling public which in-
clude only public places operated by federal, state or local
governments, natural phenomena, historic sites, areas of na-
tural scenic beauty or outdoor recreation, and places for
camping, lodging, eating, and vehicle service and repair.
In the opinion of many conservationists, however, two "loopholes" existed
under the bonus program. During the Senate debates on the bill in 1958,
Senator Norris Cotton (R-N.H.) offered an amendment, which was ac-
cepted,5 to exclude outdoor advertising controls along any portion of the
interstate system right-of-way which was acquired prior to July 1, 1956. The
effect of this amendment was to limit outdoor advertising controls to inter-
state highways constructed on new locations but, by the terms of the lan-
guage, virtually every crossroad and interchange area was also excluded.
Typically, the interstate system crosses public road rights-of-way which
were acquired prior to July 1, 1956. Therefore, the portions of such older
rights-of-way which coincide With any part of the width of the interstate
right-of-way are not new locations. This exclusion is significant because
interchange locations along the interstate system average one per mile in
urban areas and one every four miles in rural areas.
In 1959, an amendment introduced by Senator Robert S. Kerr (D-Okla.)
was adopted6 which has the effect of requiring the exclusion of segments of
the interstate system which traverse commercial and industrial zones within
the boundaries of incorporated municipalities as those boundary lines ex-
isted on September 21, 1959 (the date of enactment of the amendment),
and other areas where the land use as of September 21, 1959, was clearly
established by state law as industrial or commercial. Prior to this amend-
ment, state agreements could provide for the exclusion of similar areas in
the discretion of the Secretary of Commerce (now Transportation). These
4. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1958, 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1964).
5. 104 CONG. REC. 5400 (1958).
6. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 611, § 106.
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two excluded areas have become commonly known as the "Kerr" and "Cot-
ton" areas.
The federal bonus law did not specify the methods to be used by a state
in effecting the required outdoor advertising controls. Thus, the states could
elect to control signs by: (1) an exercise of police power similar to land
use controls established under zoning laws, or (2) by an exercise of the power
of eminent domain such as the purchase of negative easements, or (3) by a
combination of both, using a vested rights theory for existing signs. Any
state which acquired advertising rights by purchase or condemnation could
receive federal reimbursement for 90 percent of the cost, provided such cost
did not exceed five percent of the cost of the interstate right-of-way within
the project.
When the program expired on June 30, 1965, 25 states had entered into
bonus agreements. 7 Of this number only three states elected to use the
power of eminent domain to control signs." Seven states made provision for
the purchase or condemnation of certain existing signs along with police
power controls, 9 and the remainder selected police power measures only. One
of the reasons for the overwhelming selection of police power techniques by
these states stems from the fact that there has been a continuing battle to
regulate outdoor advertising signs by state and local communities for over
70 years under nuisance or zoning enactments, which are police power meas-
ures.
Although most of the states have faced court challenges of their outdoor
advertising control laws during this 70 year span, only six of the 25 bonus
states have court decisions on the constitutionality of their statutes enacted
specifically to comply with the bonus program. These states are Kentucky,
New Hampshire, Washington, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Georgia. 10 New York, a
bonus state, had a substantially similar statute applicable to its state thru-
7. California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
8. Nebraska, New Jersey, and North Dakota.
9. Connecticut, Delaware, California, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Iowa, and Rhode
Island.
10. State Hwy. Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 372 (1966); Moore v.
Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. Ky. 1964); In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268,
169 A.2d 762 (1961); Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200
N.E.2d 328 (1964); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d
248 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); Fuller v. Fiedler Dane Co., 19 Wis.
2d 422, 120 N.W.2d 700 (1963). In the Wisconsin case the lower court had ruled that
outdoor advertising signs were intrusions upon the highway and that the sign owner
derived no property right from the owner of such property, but had held the regulation
unreasonable on other points.
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way tested during this period and, therefore, will be included in this
discussion." Significantly, each of these states used police power meth-
ods to control the erection and removal of outdoor advertising signs. Typi-
cally, the plaintiffs in these cases contended that the controls serve only
aesthetic objectives and, therefore, do not have any substantial relationship
to health, safety, morals, or the general welfare, which are the proper ob-
jectives for an exercise of police power. Consequently, plaintiffs argued
that the removal of nonconforming signs violates the due process clause of
state and federal constitutions because the statutes authorized a taking of
property without just compensation.
The state courts, with the exception of Georgia, upheld the constitu-
tionality of these statutes on all points. The Georgia court found the state
law unconstitutional on its face as a "legislative exercise in futility," stating
that "[i]ts sole purpose is to dictate, control and limit uses of private property
for public purpose, without a semblance of provision for first paying for
such taking or damaging."' 12 The Georgia court did not discuss the state's
police power or even attempt to analyze or distinguish between the power
of eminent domain and police power.
The remaining six state courts dealt with the issue of aesthetics by ruling
that it is within the public welfare to promote natural beauty surrounding
the highways. Typical of the courts' pronouncements is the statement made
by the Kentucky court:
Closely allied to the enjoyment factor is the promotion of the
scenic beauty surrounding the highways. Aesthetic considerations
are of sufficient potency for the legislature to find a public neces-
sity for this type of legislation.' 3
With regard to the proposition that these statutes authorize the taking of
property without just compensation, the courts uniformly took the position
that outdoor advertising signs are a use of the public highway. This con-
cept, in effect, views the abutting owner's claim as a permissive easement
which may be withdrawn without compensation, a concept which grew out
of the following court statement made in the early 1900's:
Suppose that the owner of private property-should require the ad-
vertiser to paste his posters upon the billboards so that they would
face the interior of the property, instead of the exterior. Billboard
advertising would die a natural death if this were done, and its
real dependency not upon the unrestricted use of private prop-
11. New York State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, 12 App. Div. 2d 223,
210 N.Y.S.2d 193, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1961).
12. State Hwy. Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 771, 152 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1966).
13. Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881, 886-87 (Ky. 1964).
[Vol. 20: 69
The Highway Beautification Act
erty but upon the unrestricted use of the public highways is at
once apparent. . . . [W]e conceive that the regulation of bill-
boards and their restriction is not so much a regulation of private
property as it is a regulation of the use of the streets and public
thoroughfares.
14
In the New York case, for example, the court stated:
[I]t was the very construction of the Thruway which created the
element of value in land abutting the road. Billboards and other
advertising signs are obviously of no use unless there is a highway
to bring the traveler within view of them. What was taken by
the regulation, therefore, was the value which the Thruway itself
had added to the land and of this the defendant cannot be heard to
complain. 15
The Ohio court was even stronger:
Furthermore, as hereinbefore pointed out, the use prohibited by
these statutes is in substance and effect a use of the public highway
for advertising purposes. To hold that such a nonconforming use
should be protected would in effect lead to the absurd result of
recognizing such use, before its statutory prohibition, as creating a
vested private property interest in the highway.'
Following the Georgia decision, the State of Washington was the last to
have its bonus statute challenged. With reference to the Georgia decision,
the court declared, "We know of only one court which has invalidated a
statute of this type, and we find the opinion singularly unpersuasive.'1
7
Highway Beautification Act of 1965
In February of 1965 President Johnson transmitted a message to Congress
on the natural beauty of our country. 18  This message pointed out that the
bonus program would expire on June 30, 1965, and that the President was
not satisfied with its effectiveness. At that time the program had been in ef-
fect for seven years and only 20 states had entered into bonus agreements.
Based partly on the President's announcements concerning highway beauti-
fication, five additional states 9 entered into the bonus program just before
it expired, bringing the total to 25 states.
14. Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 P.I. 580, 609, appeal dismissed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918).
15. New York State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y.2d 151, 157,
176 N.E.2d 566, 569, 218 N.Y.S.2d 640, 649 (1961).
16. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 437, 200 N.E.2d 328,
340 (1964).
17. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 417, 439 P.2d 248, 261
(1968).
18. H.R. Doc. No. 78, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
19. California, May 29, 1965; Colorado, June 30, 1965; Georgia, May 26, 1965;
Illinois, June 29, 1965; and Iowa, May 31, 1965.
1970]
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In May of 1965, the first White House Conference on Natural Beauty was
convened. In response to its recommendations, the President transmitted
draft legislation to the Congress on highway beautification. 20  The Act as
passed by Congress on October 22, 1965, contains three major titles and
its stated purpose is to protect the public investment in the interstate and
federal-aid primary highways, to promote the safety and recreational value
of public travel, and to preserve natural beauty.
21
Title I
Under Title I of the Act, outdoor advertising controls are extended to the
federal-aid primary system which means that in addition to controlling ap-
proximately 42,500 miles of the interstate system, the controls now extend
to approximately 268,000 miles of federal-aid highways. In recognition
of the vast impact such a program would have on the sign industry, Con-
gress provided that states must provide just compensation for certain sign
removals. 22  As under the 1958 program, actual control of outdoor ad-
vertising remains in the hands of the states. However, the federal law
abandoned the "carrot approach" for the "stick approach" by requiring the
states to make provision for effective control of outdoor advertising within
660 feet of the right-of-way of these highways or lose ten percent of their
federal-aid highway funds. Effective control means that only the following
signs are permitted:
(1) Those located in commercial or industrial zones or in un-
zoned commercial or industrial areas. These areas and the
size, lighting, and spacing requirements to be applied to such
areas are determined by agreement between the Secretary
of Transportation and the state. This provision recognizes
existing and future commercial and industrial zones and
areas without limitation and in that respect is looser than the
comparable "Kerr area" under the bonus program. How-
ever signs in such areas are no longer excluded from control.
(2) Directional and other official signs, excluding those pertain-
ing to natural wonders, scenic, and historic attractions. These
signs are subject to size, lighting, and spacing requirements
promulgated by the Secretary.
(3) On-premise signs which are not subject to any control under
the Act.
20. H.R. Doc. No. 191, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
21. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (Supp. V, 1970).
22. Such signs include: (1) signs lawfully in existence on October 22, 1965; (2)
those lawfully on any highway made a part of the Interstate or primary system on
or after October 22, 1965, and before January 1, 1968 (the effective control date); and
(3) those lawfully erected on or after January 1, 1968. Id. § 131(g) (Supp. V,
1970).
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The 1965 Act eliminated the pre-1956 "Cotton area" exclusion and spec-
ified that a bonus state could remain eligible to receive bonus payments pro-
vided it maintained the control required under the new law or the bonus
agreement, whichever was more strict. This had the effect of requiring a
bonus state to control the interstate system in accordance with a combina-
tion of the two laws and to control the primary system in accord with the
1965 Act to remain eligible for bonus payments. In 1968 Congress amended
this section so that a bonus state could remain eligible for bonus payments
if it continued to carry out its bonus agreement, but it was not exempted from
the 1965 Act requirements. 23 This amendment has the effect of allowing
a bonus state to receive bonus payments even if it is subject to the ten percent
penalty for noncompliance with the 1965 Act. However, if a bonus state
elects to comply with both programs, it must carry out its bonus agreement
along the interstate system except where the 1965 Act imposes more stringent
requirements. Thirty-three states, and the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico, have enacted some form of legislation in response to the 1965 Act.
24
It is interesting to note, however, that ten of the bonus states have not taken
legislative action to comply.
25
The outdoor advertising control provisions of the 1965 Act have not, as
yet, produced any major decisions by the courts. 26 The only litigation
questioning the constitutionality of the federal law is the pending case of
Lamm v. Volpe 27 before the federal district court in Denver, Colorado.
This suit was brought by a state legislator who is seeking a court determina-
tion that the states cannot be penalized ten percent of their federal-aid funds
for failure to provide just compensation for sign removals. 28  It is con-
tended that mandatory just compensation under the 1965 Act unconstitution-
ally limits the powers of states to legislate the method of removing signs.
Title H
Similar to the outdoor advertising control provisions, Title II of the Act re-
23. Id. § 131(j).
24. Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.
25. Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington. Wisconsin took no action and Colorado enacted moritorium legislation only.
26. See Southeastern Displays Inc. v. Ward, 414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967); Whitmier
& Ferris Co. v. State, 20 N.Y.2d 413, 230 N.E.2d 904, 284 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1967);
Micalite Sign Corp. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 126 Vt. 498, 236 A.2d 680 (1967).
27. Civil No. C-1870 (1970).
28. Lamm & Yasinow, Highway Beautification Act of 1965: A study case in Legis-
lative Frustration, 43 DENVER L.J. 437 (1969).
1970]
Catholic University Law Review
quires the states to make provision for the effective control of junkyards
within 1,000 feet of the right-of-way of interstate and federal-aid primary
highways or lose ten percent of their federal-aid highway funds. Effective
control means that all junkyards within these areas must be screened or
otherwise removed from sight unless they are located in zoned or unzoned
industrial areas. The unzoned industrial areas are to be determined by the
state subject to the approval of the Secretary of Transportation. Within
such industrial areas junkyards may be established without regard to the
screening or removal requirements. They are, in effect, exempt from con-
trol. Just compensation is mandatory for the removal, relocation, or dis-
posal of certain junkyards which cannot be effectively screened.29 Federal
funds will participate in 75 percent of the state's compensation, landscaping,
and screening costs.
It is important to point out that the Highway Beautification Act of 1965
did not introduce the concept of screening or removing junkyards from view
along the highway. At the time federal legislation was being considered, the
Bureau of Public Roads sent a questionnaire to each state highway depart-
ment to determine the extent of existing authority to control junkyards. It
was learned that 23 states had statutes controlling the location or screening
of junkyards on a statewide basis. In addition, 46 states could control
junkyards in municipalities or other political subdivisions by zoning, licensing,
or other legal methods; and 28 states had some legal method of controlling
junkyards outside of municipalities.
In response to the Highway Beautification Act, 40 states have taken legis-
lative action to control junkyards,3 0 and two states and the District of
Columbia have adequate provisions under prior enactments.3 1
The case law history of junkyard controls reveals that typically such
controls have been invoked under the state's police power, and, like outdoor
advertising controls, have been challenged on the basis of improper exercise
of the police power to achieve aesthetic objectives. While the earlier cases
recognizing the common law rule against aesthetics were somewhat divided
29. (1) Such junkyards include those lawfully in existence on October 22, 1965;
(2) those lawfully along any highway made a part of the Interstate or primary system
on or after October 22, 1965, and before January 1, 1968 (the effective control date);
and (3) those lawfully established on or after January 1, 1968. 23 U.S.C. § 136
(j) (Supp. V, 1970).
30. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming, and Puerto Rico.
31. Illinois and Washington.
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on whether a screening requirement was purely for aesthetic purposes,32
the recent cases discard this old concept by upholding such statutes on the
basis of promoting scenic beauty surrounding the highways.
33
Since a junkyard may comply with these laws by screening where possi-
ble outside of industrial areas, junkyard locations are not severely limited.
By contrast, locations for signs both within and outside commercial and in-
dustrial areas are restricted by the outdoor advertising control laws. In addi-
tion, since there are many more signs in existence than there are junkyards,
the outdoor advertising control provisions are far more controversial than
the corresponding junkyard controls. Therefore, as these laws are imple-
mented, a greater number of court challenges can be expected to involve
sign controls.
Title III
Federal legislation in the field of landscaping and roadside development had
its genesis in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 193 8, 34 which authorized such
work as a part of the normal costs of highway construction. The 1940 Act 3
added the concept of nearby land acquisition for preservation of natural
beauty within the highway corridor. It also introduced the use of 100 per-
cent federal funds for this latter purpose. Normally, federal-aid highway
funds are available to pay a share of the states' costs rather than 100 per-
cent of such costs. However, until the enactment of the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act of 1965 very little was accomplished by the states in connection
with scenic easements or similar land acquisition. Few states availed them-
selves of the opportunity of acquiring scenic strips outside the right-of-way at
the expense of the federal government because the federal scenic acquisition
funds would have come out of the sums apportioned to the states for highway
construction. Thus, any funds used for scenic purposes became a total loss
for mileage purposes.
32. See, e.g., People v. Dickenson, 171 Cal. App. 2d 872, 343 P.2d 809 (1959);
People v. Sevel, 120 Cal. App. 2d 907, 261 P.2d 359 (1953); Vermont Salvage Corp. v.
Village of St. Jolinsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A.2d 188 (1943).
33. See, e.g., Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); Deimeke v.
State Hwy. Comm'n, 444 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1969); State v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 108
S.E.2d 74 (1959); State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 243 N.E.2d 66 (1968); Oregon
City of Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965); Farley v. Graney, 146 W. Va. 22,
119 S.E.2d 833 (1960). In Burnham v. State Hwy. Dep't, 224 Ga. 543, 163 S.E.2d 698
(1968), the court dismissed the aesthetics argument since the state legislature was author-
ized by constitutional amendment to zone land adjacent to the highway for the control of
junkyards and existing junkyards were to receive just compensation. The constitutional
amendment was a direct result of the court's action in the outdoor advertising case of
State Hwy. Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 372 (1966).
34. § 1(c), 52 Stat. 633.
35. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1940, § 11, 54 Stat. 867.
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Title III of the Highway Beautification Act is subdivided into two parts.
The first section provides that the Secretary of Transportation may approve
the costs of landscaping and roadside development as a part of the con-
struction costs of federal-aid highways. Under the second section, states are
given the equivalent of three percent of their total federal-aid apportionment
for landscaping and roadside development within the rights-of-way and for
acquiring and improving adjacent strips of land. These funds provide for
the restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty, the acquisi-
tion and development of publicly owned rest and recreation areas, and the
construction of sanitary and other facilities within or adjacent to the highway
right-of-way. Funds under the latter section are not to be matched by the
states and they come from the general fund of the Treasury rather than the
Highway Trust Fund. Moreover, for the first time, they are given in addi-
tion to the state's regular apportionment.
This last phase of the three title program has involved most of the federal
funds appropriated to date, and has received the least publicity, even
though it has proven to be the most successful aspect of the Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965. Title I of the Highway Beautification Act amended
23 U.S.C. § 131, Title II added 23 U.S.C. § 136, and Title III amended
23 U.S.C. § 319, yet the three titles have consistently been tied together as
if they had been codified into one section of law. Each section contains its
own funding authorizations and can be administered independently. How-
ever, since the three titles are considered a single package, Title I's contro-
versial sign controls have had an adverse effect on the funding of Title III's
landscaping and scenic enhancement programs.
Only minor legal problems have been encountered in the construction
of safety rest areas and essential landscaping within the accepted right-of-
way. The acquisition of scenic easements easily hurtled the constitutional
question of whether such takings were for a public purpose. In a lead-
ing Wisconsin decision on this point, Kamrowski v. State,36 the court stated:
The learned trial judge succinctly answered plaintiff's claim that
occupancy by the public is essential in order to have public use by
saying that in the instant case, "the 'occupancy' is visual." The en-
joyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes along the
highway seems to us to be a direct use by the public of the rights in
land which have been taken in the form of a scenic easement, and
not a mere incidental benefit from the owner's private use of the
land.3 1
With regard to aesthetics, the court further declared: "Whatever may be the
36. 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
37. Id. at 261, 142 N.W.2d at 797.
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law with respect to zoning restrictions based upon aesthetic considerations,
a stronger argument can be made in support of the power to take property,
in return for just compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, than
for the imposition of police power restrictions for such purpose. '3 8
Restudy of the Highway Beautification Act
Largely due to the controversy surrounding the highway beautification pro-
gram, and particularly outdoor advertising controls, funds were not au-
thorized or appropriated for fiscal years 1968 and 1969 to carry out the three
titles of the program. On June 24, 1969, Secretary of Transportation
John A. Volpe announced, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Roads, that the Department would restudy the highway beautification pro-
gram and possibly recommend modifications.39 At that time there was a lot
of talk that the program would be cut back extensively so that it would be
less costly and controversial. At about the same time, environmental issues
started to reach the foreground with such controversial examples as the sell-
ing of public offshore property to private developers, and the Santa Barbara
oil well spill-out. Most Americans for the first time started to learn the
meaning of the word "ecology." This concern led to the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.40 With this rapid turn of events,
the restudy of the Highway Beautification Act was influenced and the recom-
mendations made to the Congress reflect this increased concern for the en-
vironment. 4
1
A proposed bill would change the flat ten percent penalty provision for
noncompliance with outdoor advertising and junkyard controls to a gradu-
ated scale of from one to ten percent depending on the number of years of
noncompliance. The penalty would be applicable only after the state legis-
latures have had an opportunity to comply with the Act. The 660 foot con-
trol limit for outdoor advertising and the 1,000 foot control limit for junk-
yards would be eliminated and the limit of visibility substituted. A recent in-
ventory indicating that 1,830 jumbo signs were counted beyond the 660 foot
control line is partly responsible for this change. 42 Moreover, the former
practice of screening junkyards up to 1,000 feet from the right-of-way was
senseless when they were still visible and extended beyond this distance.
38. Id.
39. Hearings on S. 561 and S. 1442 Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., Sen. 91-14, at 3 (1969).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
41. As of this writing, the House and the Senate Subcommittees on Roads are
considering the restudy report and the proposed amendments to the program as a
part of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970.
42. Contained in the Restudy Report on the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.
19701
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Sign removal would not be required until the federal share of just com-
pensation is available and then on a schedule agreed to by the Secretary of
Transportation and the state. The directional and other official signs cate-
gory would be broadened to include signs of specific interest to the traveling
public such as gas, food, and lodging, similar to the 1958 bonus law. On-
premise signs would be studied and a report submitted to Congress, together
with recommendations, by January 1972. The program would be funded at
a level to accommodate required sign removals within five to six years. The
present junkyard control law limits federal participation in state costs to land-
scaping and screening and limits federal participation in removal costs to just
compensation granted to owners of junkyards. The proposed bill would ex-
tend federal participation to include the states' cost of removal, relocation,
and disposal in order to be more flexible and equitable to the states. The
costs of developing publicly owned and controlled information center build-
ings would be added to the development of rest and recreation areas and
sanitary facilities under Title III of the Beautification Act. All other pro-
visions of the Highway Beautification Act would remain the same.
Review of the Effectiveness and Direction of the Act
Concerning Urban Areas
At this point, we can more closely evaluate the highway beautification pro-
gram and its effect upon urban areas. Obviously, the Highway Beautification
Act has limited goals. Its primary thrust is aimed at protection of rural
areas-the natural beauty of the countryside.
Allowing signs in commercial and industrial areas, and junkyards in indus-
trial areas, is simply a recognition of existing local zoning ordinances. Al-
most half of the federal fund appropriated for landscaping and scenic en-
hancement have been used for the construction of safety rest areas which are
located outside of cities, and virtually all acquisition of land for scenic
preservation has been outside of cities. Although it might appear that the
federal law falls short of protecting urban segments of federal-aid high-
ways, the federal role in urban areas has traditionally been one of providing
leadership in conjunction with local zoning and urban development efforts.
In rural areas however, few land use controls exist and small, rural com-
munities can hardly afford the cost of protecting scenic areas; particularly
when such areas are in demand for land development.
Traditionally, it has been felt that the cities are adeqately equipped to, in
effect, "fend for themselves" and should be encouraged to do so. All major
cities with the exception of Houston, Texas, have comprehensive zoning in
effect. They have larger budgets, full-scale land use controls, sophisticated
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planning processes, and a capability to enact all forms of local legislation
under their home-rule charters. By contrast, their counterparts in rural areas
must await action by the state legislature for authority to act on many similar
measures. The legislative history of the 1958 bonus outdoor advertising
control law reveals that one of the reasons for exempting commercial and
industrial zones within incorporated municipalities was not to interfere with
home rule. 43 It was indicated that signs were already subject to control in
the cities and federal control was, therefore, unnecessary. Typically outdoor
advertising signs are limited by local regulation to commercial and industrial
zones within most incorporated municipalities. Thus, the Highway Beautifi-
cation Act attempts to reconcile the urban-rural problem by representing
both the potential and the limits of federal control. In the cities, it should
serve as encouragement to local government to assume a position of leader-
ship in this area.
Unfortunately, the fact that many cities have not done the job they are ca-
pable of doing is also indicated by the 1965 Act. For the first time size, light-
ing, and spacing requirements applicable to signs in commercial and industrial
areas are to be determined by agreement between the Secretary of Trans-
portation and the individual states. This radical departure from the previous
practice of excluding size, lighting, and spacing requirements from control
proved to be the most controversial item in the Highway Beautification Act.
The outdoor advertising industry objected strenuously. The Act called for
such criteria to be determined "consistent with customary use" and the in-
dustry alleged that customary use would vary from city to city and, there-
fore, should not have statewide application. The industry also feared that
the federal government would promulgate national standards in this regard
rather than individual state-by-state agreements. The state highway depart-
ments were not anxious to assume the increased administrative burden of
controlling signs in heavily built-up cities and towns. Thus, on May 24, 1967,
then Secretary Boyd, in a letter to the Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Roads, clarified the manner in which this section of law would be ad-
ministered. 4 4 He stated that the states could certify that either the state au-
thority or a bona fide local zoning authority has made a determination of
customary use in the zoned commercial and industrial areas. A determina-
tion of customary use will be considered as an acceptable basis for standards
as to size, lighting, and spacing in the commercial and industrial areas within
the geographical jurisdiction of that state or local authority. The effect of
this statement is to exempt from the terms of the agreement any political sub-
43. 104 CONG. REC. 5105 (1958).
44. S. REP. No. 542, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1967).
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division which controls size, lighting, and spacing of signs in such zones
when so certified by the state. In 1968, the Act was amended to incor-
porate these changes which had already been accomplished administratively.
The pertinent provision reads as follows:
Whenever a bona fide State, county or, local zoning authority has
made a determination of customary use, such determination will be
accepted in lieu of controls by agreement in the zoned commercial
and industrial areas within the geographical jurisdiction of such
authority.45
Conservationists are also opposed to the commercial and industrial area
provisions because they feel that there is no protection for future commercial
and industrial expansion. They contend that a freeze or cut-off date should
have been put into the federal law so that signs could not be erected in fu-
ture commercial and industrial zones. This is merely one example which
illustrates the difficulty of imposing federal requirements in urban areas.
The Act is also criticized because on-premise signs are exempt from control.
Critics contend that roadside businesses, in particular, have a tendency to
erect signs which shout for attention and are, therefore, often more garish
and unsightly than the off-premise billboard. Wherever extensive com-
mercial and industrial zones exist, these businesses do compete for atten-
tion. Naturally this occurrence is predominant in urban areas. In response
to this criticism, the proposed amendments would provide for a federal study
of the on-premise sign problem in relation to the goals of the Highway
Beautification Act. Obviously, federal controls in this area would be
equally difficult and controversial.
All of this controversy, however, misses the point. Critics expect federal
legislation to cure, or not cure (depending on the point of view) the defi-
ciencies of zoning as it exists today in our urban areas. Whether zoning re-
quirements are adequate or inadequate in relation to environmental and aes-
thetic issues is a problem which should be dealt with by the authors and
administrators of zoning policy. It is here at the grass-roots level that spe-
cific problems dealing with local land use can be most effectively handled.
One writer has summed up zoning history in a rather caustic over-simpli-
fied fashion, but it bears repeating to put the problem into proper perspec-
tive:
Perhaps on that historic day in 1926 when five of the nine Supreme
Court judges voted in favor of the City of Euclid, Ohio, it was one
of those times when the courts led us down the wrong path. Per-
haps if it had gone the other way we would have been forced into
devising more subtle and less discriminatory ways of regulating the
45. 23 U.S.C. § 131(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
[Vol. 20:69
The Highway Beautification Act
use of land . . . perhaps we would have invented performance
standards twenty-five years earlier. But in any event, Euclid won
and virtually every city quickly divided itself up into two kinds of
districts: the nice parts of town, and the remainder. In the nice
parts of town strict regulations were employed to keep out any-
thing that would attract, or even be reminiscent of, those people
from the other parts of town. The other parts of town, however,
were put in what I would call "garbage can districts" in which any-
thing and everything was permitted, except a few industries that
were thought to be so offensive that their odor might even per-
meate the nice neighborhoods. You know the list: abbatoirs,
bag cleaning, ink manufacturers, etc.
The courts quickly agreed that signs could be excluded from the
nice parts of town, although they had to invent a number of va-
rieties of legal mumbo-jumbo to accomplish it. But the courts
could see no justification for regulation of signs in the garbage can
districts because, after all, who cared what happened there any-
way? So if I may overgeneralize a bit, but not much, an accom-
modation was gradually reached between the sign industry and
local governments across the country. The signs were kept out of
the nice districts and were left to flourish elsewhere. That way
billboards were, like the slums, never seen by the nice people un-
less they happened to ride a railroad train. . . and then they pulled
down the shades. 46
It is becoming harder and harder to "pull down the shades" as society be-
comes more crowded and it is also becoming obvious that perpetuating
"garbage can districts" is as antiquated as yesterday's parlor car.
How far federal legislation could or should go in this field is a matter of
speculation. As mentioned before, the Highway Beautification Act was in-
tended primarily to protect the rural countryside-the view from the road as
we travel across the country on our nation's major highways. However, since
the public has a tendency to ask the federal government to pick up the ball
when there is local inaction, the highway beautification program has begun
to venture into these areas. Ultimately, a vigorous federal program may
provide the impetus for local self help and the result could lead to a healthy
combination of federal, state, and local efforts to arrive at some innovative ap-
proaches to the urban problem.
The trend today is toward rapid change. Society is no longer willing to put
up with the degradation of the environment in the name of progress-or, as it
often means, for the sake of the fast buck. Citizens no longer feel that you
46. F. BOSSELMAN, OUTDOOR ADVERTISING HISTORY & REGULATION 99 (1969). This
statement is born out by the courts. See, e.g., Central Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Village of Evendale, 54 Ohio 354, 124 N.E.2d 189 (1954); Naegele Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co. v. Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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can't "fight city hall." This is evidenced by increased indignation, protest,
and an increasing number of lawsuits concerning environmental issues.
Attitudes are changing toward land use also, as can be seen by the advent
of exclusive zoning and high-quality industrial parks and shopping centers.
Thus, it may not be long before the garbage can district is a thing of the past.
Courts are reflecting this changing attitude by recognizing human values in
addition to economic values. 47 They are rapidly discarding the traditional
view concerning land use regulation for aesthetic objectives and are uphold-
ing legislation aimed at improving the appearance of the community and the
preservation of scenic and historic values. 48  The following statement of Mr.
Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker49 has been credited with the rapid
development in this field of law:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to de-
termine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized
agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide
variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those
who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capitol should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing
in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. 50
In the past ten years progress has been made at the state and local levels
in the form of legislation and regulation to preserve and protect the environ-
ment, but it has been only recently that these issues have become a dynamic
force. The time is ripe for a long hard look at the urban area-the heavily
built up sections of town, the garbage can districts, the ghetto, and the high-
ways interlacing these areas-to devise solutions to upgrade these long for-
gotten "black eyes" in the community.
Too often, we view the urban mess as a problem which we cannot do much
about and therefore we concentrate on new development-the prospective
47. See cases cited notes 10, 11, 26 and 33, supra.
48. Murphy v. Westport, 131 Conn. 392, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Sunad Inc. v. Sarasota,
122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade County v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); Merritt
v. Peters, 65 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1953); United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1,
198 A.2d 447 (1964); Lionhead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d
693 (1952); Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1951);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963); Reid v. Architectural Bd., 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.
2d 74 (1963).
49. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
50. Id. at 33. Hawaii has incorporated this philosophy into its constitution.
HAWAII CONST. art. 8, § 5.
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view. It is still widely believed that we must protect residential areas and un-
developed areas but that there is no aesthetic, cultural, historical, or other
value worth protecting in commercial and industrial areas. When older resi-
dential or apartment areas merge or border on commercial and industrial
areas, the "nice" people move out, property values go down, and the areas
are forgotten until they become so blighted that we tear them down and start
all over with urban renewal.
Another phenomenon in the urban area appears in the highway ap-
proaches to the inner city. Often the first sight a visitor has of a city is of its
most decayed area. This is largely attributable to the fact that when these
cities were developing, the now blighted areas were the outlying districts
where the very obnoxious land user, such as the ink manufacturer, had to lo-
cate. Under the common law doctrine of nuisances, such obnoxious land uses
could be abated even if they were in existence prior to the time the neigh-
borhood developed around them. 51 Thus, these land uses moved as far out
as possible to protect their investments; in some cases the move was the re-
sult of a court edict. 52 Another plague of the highway approaches to our
cities is commercial strip development. Main approaches to a city are a
favorite location for highway-oriented businesses due to the heavy volume of
traffic along these roads. Where this strip development stretches into the
surrounding counties or townships, it often represents an economic boon to
the local community, but an eyesore in the hodge podge way it develops.
Route 1 between Washington, D. C., and Baltimore is a classic example.
This route is dotted with motels, restaurants, drive-ins, and service stations,
mostly deteriorated since construction of the newer Baltimore-Washington
Parkway. Intermingled with these businesses are gift shops, antique shops,
outdoor shops, billboards, cemeteries, whiskey manufacturers, brick and
block manufacturers, junkyards, shopping centers, the University of Mary-
land, lumber yards, trailer parks, clothing manufacturers, apartments, homes,
a United States agricultural center, and more.
A New Approach
One answer to such urban problems would be to adopt a new approach at the
state and local levels. This could be accomplished by a shift in the em-
phasis, direction, and goals of state and local programs, including local
zoning provisions, so that commercial and industrial areas could be pro-
51. See, e.g., Bradley v. People, 56 N.Y. 72 (1866); Myers v. Malcolm, 6 N.Y. 292
(1844); Elkins v. State, 19 Tenn. 109 (1841).
52. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57
Pa. 274 (1868).
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tected and improved. At the state level, this could be accomplished by re-
quiring that comprehensive land use planning be coordinated among local
governments, particularly among adjoining communities. Land use plans
should be discouraged from perpetuating the garbage can districts rep-
resented by cumulative zoning and should encourage the newer zoning tech-
niques. Along highways, the state could encourage multiple use concepts,
including the use of air space, to foster better utilization of the land and to
protect established communities and neighborhoods. These are but a few
concepts which could be incorporated in a positive way into the planning
process.
State enabling legislation with regard to planning, zoning, and subdivision
regulation, which forms the framework for local control in this area, could be
modernized to provide greater flexibility in dealing with commercial and in-
dustrial areas. For example, such legislation could specifically authorize
amortization techniques that gradually eliminate nonconforming uses and
structures. If aesthetic and environmental regulation such as sign and junk-
yard controls were applied to commercial and industrial areas, amortization
could be used to correct past indifferences. At present only four states have
specifically authorized amortization in their enabling legislation.53  While
local communities in states without specific legislation have used this ap-
proach with court approval, 54 most communities are still hesitant to use it
without specific authority. Enabling legislation could also set guidelines for
the development of performance standards. This legal technique is a de-
parture from the practice in zoning to simply set minimums and maximums in
land development. Most developers, for economic reasons, go as far as the
"law will allow," and the result is stereotyped, unimaginative land use pat-
terns or discordant development. Performance standards, however, reward
high quality development and thus promote imaginative uses of land. Aes-
thetic and environmental considerations taken into account in developing
these standards have considerable potential in commercial and industrial
areas-for example blending land uses into the environment, architectural
improvement, and open space promotion. Control of on-premise signs could
be effectively achieved by providing rewards for signs which do not shout
with banners, streamers, flashing, moving, or blinking lights, and the like.
Architectural controls could also be applied through zoning in certain cir-
53. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-19 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 69-835 (Supp.
1967); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2930 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-2718 (1962).
54. Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); Grant v. Mayor & City
Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957); Harbison v. Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958); Seattle v. Martin, 54 Wash. 2d 541,
342 P.2d 602 (1959).
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cumstances. This tool would have to be used cautiously since it has the in-
herent potential to thwart innovation and variation. It is effective, for ex-
ample, to preserve historic parts of a city. The courts of Louisiana and New
Mexico have upheld ordinances relating to architectural controls in historic
parts of a city on the basis that the beauty of the city attracted tourists. 5
Many of the concepts and legal tools adapted to protect rural, residential,
and scenic areas could be evaluated and adapted to commercial, industrial,
and heavily built up urban areas. Two of these come immediately to mind
-the scenic highway concept and tax incentives.
The scenic highway concept controls land uses within the highway corri-
dor by a combination of police power and eminent domain. 50 Land or
interests in land, such as scenic easements, are acquired in areas of scenic
beauty which should be permanently preserved. Zoning and other land use
regulations are imposed on the remaining land to promote desirable land
uses and to prevent uses which are not in harmony with the setting. It
doesn't take much imagination to conceive of an urban scenic or historic high-
way utilizing these techniques. Some of our man-made beauty is just as
worthy of protection as natural beauty-e.g., city skylines, dramatic city
entrances, historic areas, distinctive older sections of towns, and other inter-
esting urban sites which are slowly disappearing and disintegrating.
It is such a waste to allow historic, scenic, and interesting mills, factories,
markets, and shops to crumble-buildings that are landmarks of another
era-while we concentrate so hard on preserving historic homes and man-
sions, and places of momentous occasions. Contrast this situation with the
charm of San Francisco. From the cable cars to the revitalization of old
canneries and factories, one gets the impression that the citizens of San
Francisco are proud of their city's history and would never discard a part of
it. In many other cities, if you look through the old business and industrial
districts, there is a charm which is simply hidden in the maze of discordant
and delapidated land uses fused together. It is amazing how many rivers,
streams, and other estuaries are likewise hidden in such areas. City and
state highway departments in coordination with urban renewal agencies could
make great strides in preserving scenic or historic urban highway corridors.
Tax incentives such as preferences or deferrals were conceived to pre-
serve open spaces which are rapidly dwindling with urban expansion.57
55. New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 4, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); Santa Fe v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
56. See CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 227 (West 1969); CALIFORNIA TRANSPORTATION
AGENCY, DEP'T OF PUBLIC WORKS, THE SCENIC RouTE/A GUIDE FOR THE TRANSPORTA-
TION OF AN OFFICIAL SCENIC HIGHWAY (1967).
57. See Note, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt
Zoning, 12 STAN. L. REV. 638 (1960).
19701
Catholic University Law Review
Typically, property taxes are based on the highest and best use of the land
and thus farms located on the fringes of urban or suburban development sell
off to developers because of the high tax burden. In effect, then, this tech-
nique offers a reduced tax in return for environmental protection. Similar
measures might be adapted to preserve smaller open spaces in urban areas.
Because of high land values and high property taxes, particularly in business
areas, property owners tend to utilize as much of such property as possible.
Thus, a tax incentive could serve to encourage open space land uses, that is,
less than optimum development, such as the creation of private mini-parks,
malls, pedestrian ways, the planting of greenery, and similar measures. It
might prove interesting to evaluate the legal and practical aspect of utilizing
such a technique to preserve and protect the urban environment generally.
The most obvious techniques are those aimed directly at the problem they
are intended to correct. Sign and junkyard ordinances can be enacted at the
local level to accomplish results in an urban area. These local ordinances
have added merit in that they can be much more sophisticated than the cor-
responding state laws and can be used to supplement the state laws. Urban
highway corridor zoning is another direct measure which can be utilized with
a new twist. The highway corridor concept is an attempt to prevent strip
commercial development and otherwise protect the highway environment.
In urban areas it can be most useful to encourage multiple use of the high-
way right-of-way and its airspace. Manhattan's Franklin D. Roosevelt
Drive, where United Nations offices, restaurants, and gardens have expanded
over the roadway, is a good example of what might be done.
Any shift in emphasis from the traditional rural-residential protection to a
total environmental protection effort-covering the emerging urban-com-
mercial and industrial area needs-will depend upon citizen action and
support. In many communities sign ordinances have been adopted to con-
trol on and off premise advertising solely as a result of the efforts of local im-
provement associations. Since the Highway Beautification Act specifically
provides that state and local control may be more restrictive than called for
under the Act, citizen interest and effort at both state and local levels will de-
termine whether outdoor advertising and junkyard control laws barely meet
or far exceed federal requirements. By the same token concerned citizen
effort can encourage broader use of landscaping and scenic enhancement
programs in urban areas. Indeed, a local environmental effort can blend
very readily within the framework of existing federal provisions.
Many new ideas are on the horizon. The Federal Highway Administration
is working with cities to seek new and bold uses of the joint development con-
cept to achieve maximum use of scarce urban land. Highway planners are
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likewise calling for creativity and imagination in urban highway design.58 Em-
phasis is being placed on the use of tunnels, tiers, and platforms in highway
building to accommodate urban needs such as commercial activity, open
space, views, parks, playgrounds, and cultural institutions. Some planners
suggest that urban highways be designed for lower automobile speeds so that
they will require narrower rights-of-way. Along curves and ramps, lower
speeds result in the use of less space for turns which permits more flexibility
in blending the highway into the existing environment. Needless to say, the
federal landscaping and scenic enchantment provisions can and will be in-
corporated into these new concepts.
More importantly however, landscaping and scenic enhancement can be
used for "curative" purposes along existing urban highways. Federal funds
under Section 319 can be used to improve the appearance of the roadside
within and outside the right-of-way along proposed and existing highways.
Here then, is a chance not only to upgrade a highway corridor located in a
dingy setting but also to protect open space and views surrounding existing
highways. In some cases simply planting a few trees and shrubs would do
the job; other cases would require more extensive efforts. In 1966 the Bu-
reau of Public Roads set forth a list of priorities for this type of work. 59
The four priority projects were: (1) landscaping and roadside development
along existing rural sections of highway where reconstruction is not in
prospect; (2) landscaping along approaches to cities; (3) additional rest and
recreation areas; and (4) landscaping and roadside development along exist-
ing urban highways.
Contrary to an often voiced belief, the federal government and the Federal
Highway Administration have always encouraged state and local programs
which utilize new and innovative approaches to the urban problem. In 1962
for example, Congress enacted a law which requires comprehensive transpor-
tation planning, utilizing all modes of transport in urban areas of over 50,000
population.6° In 1968, the public hearing requirement for federal-aid high-
way projects was amended to include mandatory consideration of economic
and social effects of the proposed highway, its impact on the environment,
and its consistency with the goals and objectives of urban planning.6' Ad-
ministratively the Federal Highway Administration developed a new ap-
proach under this law by requiring a double hearing process-a corridor
58. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, 'URBAN ADVISORS TO THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN-
ISTRATOR, THE FREEWAY IN THE CITY (1968).
59. Circular Memorandum to Regional and Division Engineers (Apr. 7, 1966).
60. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (Supp. V, 1970).
61. Id. § 128.
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public hearing and a public hearing on the design of the highway.6 2 Relo-
cation assistance was added to the federal law in 1968,63 and the preserva-
tion of parklands became law in 1966.4
In the total picture, the Federal Highway Administration employs not only
professional engineering specialists, but also landscape architects, urban spe-
cialists, planners, sociologists, economists, and, of course, lawyers. This in
turn has fostered the utilization of similar specialists at the state and local
levels. All of these people work as a team to assure that the highway influ-
ence on its surroundings is not a blighting or devisive one. Their goal is to
make the highway a part of the overall planning program so that it will
harmonize with its surroundings and thus stabilize or enhance community
values.
We are living in a dynamic era of change brought about by public concern.
This same public concern is also beginning to unveil the fact that the authors
and administrators of our federal highway program are not the inhuman
monsters they are characterized to be. The theory that the federal bulldozer
is pushing everybody out of the way in its zeal to provide more and more
concrete ribbons is a slowly deteriorating concept.
The highway beautification program, despite all of its controversy stands
as a monument to human concern for our environment and a forerunner of
things to come.
62. Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum, 23 C.F.R. ch. I,
pt. 1, app. A (1970).
63. 23 U.S.C. § 501 (Supp. V, 1970).
64. Id. § 138.

This article is adapted from a report prepared for the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development under an
Urban Planning Research and Demonstration contract awarded to
Barton-Aschman Associates of Chicago. The report was first pub-
lished in January 1968, and the portion reprinted here remains one
of the few treatments of the legal aspects of joint development and
multiple uses of the highways.
The joint project concept involves both public and private de-
velopment of the land and air space adjacent to, above, and below
transportation corridors. Multiple uses of highway rights-of-way
can provide a means of integrating transportation corridors with
total community planning. There are legal limits, however, to
maximum use of highway rights-of-way. Statutory, as well as case
law precedents, have established guidelines as to what constitutes
public and private property uses. This article describes how far
the law has travelled in this area.
Although the joint project concept would help to alleviate the
environmental problems of neighborhood fragmentation and scenic
deterioration caused by the highway, it offers no solution to the
problems of air and noise pollution. Yet the feasibility of residen-
tial, recreational, and business uses of transportation corridors
should depend ultimately on their tolerance to noise and fumes.
The absence of any discussion in this article of the problems of
noise and air pollution as they relate to joint development and
multiple uses is an indication of the relatively recent concern for
clean air and reasonably tranquil urban streets and highways.
